Performance of investment strategies in the absence of correct beliefs

We study an evolutionary market model with long-lived assets. We show that in the absence of correct beliefs, the strategy which is “closer” to the Kelly rule cannot be driven out of the market. This means that this strategy will either dominate or at least survive. Our techniques are borrowed from the theory of random dynamical systems.     

Earned/contributed capital, dividend policy, and disclosure quality: An international study

We examine the agency cost version of the lifecycle theory of dividends by taking advantage of cross-country variations in disclosure environments. The outcome hypothesis posits that transparent disclosure environments lead to higher dividend payouts because shareholders can more accurately measure (and therefore demand) excess cash flows. In contrast, the substitute hypothesis argues that opaque disclosure environments lead to higher payouts because managers have stronger incentives to establish their reputation for fair treatment. Our empirical results confirm both hypotheses and contribute to the literature in two primary ways. First, we confirm that the lifecycle theory of dividends explains dividend payout patterns around the world. Second, and more important, we show that the firm’s disclosure environment plays a significant role in dividend payouts through its effect on agency costs; that is, we confirm an agency cost-inclusive lifecycle theory of dividends.     

It Takes Two: The Incidence and Effectiveness of Co‐CEOs

This study examines the phenomenon of co‐CEOs within publicly traded firms. Although shared executive leadership is not widespread, it occurs within some very prominent firms. We find that co‐CEOs generally complement each other in terms of educational background or executive responsibilities. Our results show that firms most likely to appoint co‐CEOs have lower leverage, a more limited firm focus, less independent board structure, fewer advising directors, lower institutional ownership, and greater levels of merger activity. The governance structure of co‐CEO firms suggests that co‐CEOships can serve as an alternative governance mechanism, with co‐CEO mutual monitoring substituting for board or external monitoring and co‐CEO complementary skills substituting for board advising. An event study indicates that the market reacts positively to appointments of co‐CEOs while a propensity score analysis shows that the presence of co‐CEOs increases firm valuation.     

Labor force participation of women left behind in Tajikistan

This paper examines the impact of male migration on the labor force participation of the women left behind in Tajikistan. Studies from many countries show that when men migrate, female labor force participation decreases and this is largely explained by the income effect from remittances. Our study challenges this finding. Using panel data from 2007, 2009 and 2011, we find that, in Tajikistan, migration has no significant effect on the number of hours that women work. We use panel data which allow us to control for unobservable heterogeneity, rather than the cross-sectional data used by others. We analyze several countervailing factors that may have neutralized the income effect, such as the need to substitute for the missing labor in the household. We also find that women work more when the household has a farm, regardless of the presence of a migrant in the household.     

Durable goods and conformity

A consumer's demand for a durable good is governed not only by his individual preferences but also by preferences of other market participants. This interdependence of preferences arises from the inevitable resale of durable goods. If most people prefer goods with certain features, original buyers conform and choose goods with these features even if they do not like them. Using a matching model, we show there is always conformity in equilibrium. The incentive to conform is strongest for long‐lived durables and for people who trade frequently. If average preferences are sufficiently strong, there is always too little conformity in equilibrium.     

The Performance Effect of Feedback Frequency and Detail: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Customer Satisfaction

This paper presents the results from a field experiment that examines the effects of nonfinancial performance feedback on the behavior of professionals working for an insurance repair company. We vary the frequency (weekly and monthly) and the level of detail of the feedback that the 800 professionals receive. Contrary to what we would expect if these professionals conformed to the model of the Bayesian decision maker, more (and more frequent) information does not always help improve performance. In fact, we find that professionals achieve the best outcomes when they receive detailed but infrequent (monthly) feedback. The treatment groups with frequent feedback, regardless of how detailed it is, perform no better than the control group (with monthly and aggregate information). The results are consistent with the information in the latest feedback report being most salient and professionals in the weekly treatments overweighting their most recent performance, hampering their ability to learn.     

Firm‐Size Wage Gaps along the Formal‐Informal Divide: Theory and Evidence

Observationally equivalent workers are paid higher wages in larger firms. This fact is often called the “firm‐size wage gap” and is regarded as a key empirical puzzle. Using microlevel data from Turkey, we document a new stylized fact: The firm‐size wage gap is more pronounced for informal (unregistered) jobs than for formal (registered) jobs. To explain this fact, we develop a two‐stage wage‐posting game with market imperfections and segmented markets, the solution to which produces wages as a function of firm size in a well‐defined subgame‐perfect equilibrium. The model proposes two explanations. First, taxes on formal employment generate a wedge between formal and informal size wage gaps. Thus, government policy can potentially affect the magnitude of the firm‐size wage gaps. The second explanation features a market‐based framework with strategic interactions. Relative to small firms, large firms typically post higher wages for both formal and informal jobs. A high‐wage formal job attracts a larger pool of applicants than a high‐wage informal job. The larger pool of applicants for the formal job, in turn, allows the firm to somewhat lower the initial wage offer, while this second‐round effect is negligible for informal jobs. As a result, size differentials are lower in formal jobs than informal jobs. We argue that the observed patterns in the use of social connections in job search and heterogeneity in job preferences can be used to justify the validity of this second mechanism.     

Compatibility and unlearning in knowledge transfer in mergers and acquisitions

Despite wide recognition of the central role of knowledge and its transfer, extant research has focused much on some important aspects of knowledge transfer and paid little attention to others. We focus on two underexplored issues in the knowledge transfer literature, namely: (a) compatibility of new knowledge with recipients’ needs, interpretations of its past experiences and its existing norms, and (b) organizational unlearning, which moderates the relationship between compatibility and extent of successful knowledge transfer. We examine different types and dimensions of knowledge compatibility and organizational unlearning within our proposed knowledge transfer process framework. We situate our discussion primarily within knowledge transfer in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Based on the proposed model, we also offer propositions future research can test.     

Transmission of China's Shocks to the BRIS Countries

This paper investigates the effects of China on the BRIS countries, namely Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa. We identify Chinese supply and demand shocks and assess their transmission to BRIS in a structural dynamic factor model framework estimated over the period 1995Q2‐2009Q4. The findings show that Chinese supply shocks are more important than its demand shocks. Supply shocks produce positive and significant output responses in all BRIS countries. And while these supply shocks have a permanent impact on the BRIS countries, the effects of demand shocks are short‐lived. Both supply and demand shocks are transmitted through trade rather than financial linkages. However, the responses of the BRIS countries are heterogeneous and therefore require country‐specific policy responses.